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Introduction 
These three plays, written only a little over forty years ago, 
seem to come from a very different world to our own. They were 
written in a country that no longer exists, and for a kind of 
theatre that would scarcely seem possible today. Their subject 
is the historical past, but a past viewed with an eye to its 
relevance and usefulness to the present, a past that still holds 
discoveries that might transform life as it is now lived - and 
not, as seems so often the case today, merely confirm it. Their 
relation to theatrical tradition itself is also different, 
treating it as living thing, to be developed and critiqued, 
rather than as a dead canon, to be quoted and pastiched. And 
behind all this lies a fundamental presupposition of the 
efficacy of art to act upon and change the social world, and the 
power of theatre as uniquely political institution. 
At the same time, they stand on the brink of the dissolution of 
all those assumptions, and register, perhaps unconsciously, 
their approaching collapse. The developments they make to the 
theatrical tradition are equally symptoms of its disintegration, 
while the subjects they address have for us today the curious 
quality of seeming both vitally important and impossibly remote 
- remote not so much because they have been resolved, but 
because they have been accepted as intractable. Their common 
theme of political violence is today treated with a kind of 
offhand cynicism, as something that everyone ‘knows’ to be 
always wrong in principle, but - given the nature of the world - 
indispensible in practice. The plays come from a time when some 
people at least were less willing to accept such contradictory 
formulations, and were ready to pose the question of political 
violence seriously, as something that must in principle have an 
answer. In this sense they reveal not so much that we have moved 
on from their preoccupations, as retreated from them, and offer, 
if nothing else, a reminder that things were quite recently very 
different - and that if they were so then, they might be again. 
At the same time, it also needs to be borne in mind that these 
works came out of a very distinct historical experience. Their 
author was a German playwright whose life, like many others’, 
was – in his words ‘intruded upon’ very early on by some of the 
better-known catastrophes of European history. Heiner Müller 
(1929-95) lived most of his life under two dictatorships, first 
growing up under the Nazi one, and then coming of age and making 
his career under its Communist successor. In his autobiography 
he recalls that one of his earliest memories was of the arrest 
of his father by the Gestapo; through a gap in his bedroom door, 
the four-year-old Müller watched his father being beaten up and 
taken away, something he describes as a ‘key scene’ for the work 
that would follow. It also perhaps played a role in his decision 
to remain in East Germany after the rest of his family had 
emigrated. This was, he later claimed, was a consciously 
political decision, and made with few illusions; though the East 
German regime was clearly a dictatorship, it was, as he put it, 
‘a dictatorship against the people who had damaged my 
childhood’. Though it was far from certain that it would 
actually build a better society, it was at least an instance of 
‘the new bad… and that was better than the comfortable old. That 
was my position at the time.’ 
It was a precarious position, not least because the dictatorship 
had little patience for critical or even ambiguous support. But 
it was probably not Müller’s only reason for staying either; 
equally important to him must have been the presence of Bertolt 
Brecht in the new state, who had returned after the war to 
settle in East Berlin. Brecht’s influence on Müller’s work 
cannot be overestimated, and much of it is concerned with 
developing the new dramatic forms devised by the older 
playwright. Müller’s earliest plays are a series of attempts to 
combine Brechtian dramatic methods with the socialist realist 
aesthetics prescribed by the new Communist state. Even at this 
stage, however, a tension between the two is already detectable. 
For Brecht’s concept of drama were inherently critical; it aimed 
at getting audiences to examine, reflect on and imagine 
alternatives to what they saw on stage. Socialist realism, by 
contrast - at least as it was understood by the East German 
authorities - was essentially an affirmative aesthetic, 
concerned with holding up examples for its audiences to admire 
and emulate. Müller’s early so-called ‘production plays’, which 
deal with the challenges of building socialism in the German 
Democratic Republic, embody this tension. The challenges they 
face – acute material shortages, a working class distrustful of 
the authorities that claim to govern in their name – seem almost 
insurmountable, while the solutions they find to them are only 
too clearly imperfect and unstable. Thus Der Lohndrücker (The 
Scab, 1957), his first major play, has as its hero the stock 
socialist realist figure of the model factory worker who 
inspires his workmates to meet the production plan; but halfway 
through it is revealed that the same hero worked just as 
enthusiastically for a Nazi munitions firm during the war, 
drastically undermining the ‘moral example’ he sets. Müller’s 
next play, Korrektur (Correction, 1958), went even further, 
showing an honest Party official who falls foul of corrupt 
working practices in the building industry. Though his talent 
was quickly recognised, he became subject to increasing 
political criticism, so much so that he was forced to rewrite 
Korrektur before its performance would be permitted. However, it 
was his third play, Die Umsiedlerin (The Resettler, 1961), a 
comedy about the government’s land reform policy, that evidently 
persuaded the authorities its author had gone too far, and 
needed to be made an example of. Accused of ‘counter-
revolutionary and anti-Communist tendencies’, it was closed down 
on after its opening night, and its actors and director forced 
to perform public self-criticisms. Müller himself was expelled 
from the Writers’ Union, placing him under an effective ban from 
publishing or staging any of his work.  
There followed several years of financial hardship and 
professional isolation, during which Müller’s efforts to get his 
work back on stage or in print were repeatedly frustrated. It 
was also a time of personal tragedy; after his next major play, 
Der Bau (The Building Site, 1966) was rejected from the theatre, 
Müller’s wife and collaborator Inge took her own life. The three 
plays in this volume come from this time. In certain respects 
they develop further themes already present in the earlier 
works; but in another more obvious way they mark a decisive 
break with them. The contemporary settings of the ‘production 
plays’ are replaced by archaic and mythical ones, their robust 
demotic dialogue by an archaic language set in rhythmic verse. 
Perhaps the most important change, though, was in their use of 
form, for in these works Müller returned to the Lehrstück or 
learning play, a radical form of political theatre had first 
been developed by Brecht forty years earlier. 
All Brecht’s theatre sought to instigate radical social change, 
but none more emphatically than the Lehrstück. It stood, so to 
speak, in the vanguard of his ‘non-Aristotelean theatre’ which 
aimed at instilling among audiences a critical consciousness of 
what they saw on stage by rejecting one of the most basic 
devices of western theatre, the manipulation of the audience’s 
empathy for its characters. Actors were encouraged, not to 
associate themselves with the parts they played, but to 
‘alienate’ themselves from them: to depict rather than embody 
their characters, to quote their lines rather than enact them.  
It was a kind of theatre that aimed a breaking the spell of the 
theatre, a kind that ‘revealed its own device’ the better to 
divert audiences’ attention away from the fortunes of the 
individual character to the sober and critical reflection upon 
his or her actions. To facilitate this, Brecht would divide up 
the action of his plays into discontinuous scenes, so that the 
stages of its narrative could be separately analysed and 
examined. 
The Lehrstück took these methods and applied them to the 
presentation of overtly political and social themes, producing 
an extremely stark and rigorous kind of theatrical text in which 
everything extraneous had been stripped out. The result has 
frequently been misunderstood as, in Jonathan Kalb’s words, a 
‘heavy-handed form of ideological indoctrination’. In fact, the 
Lehrstück was anything but this: rather than telling its 
audiences what to think, it offered them practical means for 
working out their own thoughts and attitudes towards the 
subjects presented. The plays primarily did this by rejecting 
the traditional division of theatre into actors and audience. A 
Lehrstück is a play written first and foremost for performers, 
not spectators, and the opportunities for learning that it 
offers require an active involvement. Players would rehearse, 
perform and discuss its text in a kind of master class, with 
different performers taking up different roles at different 
times, and all of them discussing changes and revisions to the 
text where necessary. As Brecht put it, what a Lehrstück had to 
teach was ‘learnt by performing, not watching it’. It therefore 
did not require a theatre at all, and indeed was conceived for 
use in schools and educational institutes, rather than 
conventional theatre.  
It was to this collectivist, participatory, radically democratic 
form of theatre that Müller turned at a time when his plays had 
been all but banned from the stage. No doubt there was a 
deliberate irony in this, but there was also a distinct purpose: 
the very ‘impossibility’ of staging such plays made them 
interesting to him, not only for what it revealed about in the 
society in which he lived, but also about the very possibility 
of political theatre itself. Reviving the form meant reassessing 
and critiquing it, as his  note at the end of Mauser makes 
clear: the three plays are ‘an experimental series’ that aims to 
‘examine/criticise Brecht’s theory and  practice of the 
Lehrstücke’. 
Brecht’s plays were written in the late 1920s and early 1930s, 
and were concerned with the critique of bourgeois society and 
the need to struggle against it. Müller’s, by contrast, written 
forty years later, have as their subject the actual societies 
that struggle brought into being. Brecht was writing in the 
aftermath of the October Revolution and the possibilities for 
social and political transformation it seemed to open up; Müller 
with the knowledge of how far those possibilities had been 
disappointed and betrayed, as well as of the crimes and 
atrocities committed in their name. Thus while Brecht wrote in a 
context of historical opportunity, Müller’s was rather one of 
missed historical chances. This, as he would later make clear in 
an interview, had profound consequences for theatre and its 
practice:   
‘when the chances are missed, what was a plan for a new world 
begins differently anew – as dialogue with the dead. […] Against 
the background of world history, for which communism is a 
requirement, the dialogue stands for a freeing of the past.’ 
Brecht’s Lehrstücke, with their ‘plan for a new world’, spoke 
directly to the future; Müller’s, by contrast, must pursue this 
task more obliquely, by turning first to the past. Only by 
coming to terms with it can another route be found out of the 
dead end of the present. But for this, a very different approach 
to Brecht’s pragmatic, commonsense, matter-of-fact rationalism 
is required. A ‘dialogue with the dead’ demands an engagement 
with the irrational, with magic, incantation and ritual, with 
dream and nightmare, with paradox and irresolvable 
contradiction. All of these are to be found Müller’s Lehrstücke, 
but perhaps the first paradox to note is between the very form 
and content of the plays themselves. The Lehrstück form 
presupposed conditions of free and open debate among its 
performers; but Müller’s works combine it with a  content that 
was, at the time of writing, politically taboo. As we have 
noted, the paradox is deliberate, and draws attention to a 
fundamental contradiction between the emancipatory claims and 
repressive reality of the societies of ‘real existing 
socialism’. It also has another consequence: since the subject 
of the plays cannot be discussed openly, they must assume the 
form of allegory, an element that was absent from Brecht’s 
original Lehrstücke. The Lehre or lesson of Müller’s plays is 
allegorical in form, because the practical models of behaviour 
they offer can only be grasped by a proper understanding of the 
past. [The Lehre of Müller’s plays only acquire their real 
significance in the light of the historical allegory they 
present. The teaching they offer in part a teaching about the 
past, because the present can no longer made sense of without 
reference to it.]  
The other striking difference of Müller’s plays is their 
hermeticism. Brecht’s works were designed for ease of use: their 
rigorous, machine-like structure, whereby narrative was divided 
up into smaller component parts, aimed at serving the needs of 
their performer-users, enabling them to dismantle and 
reconstruct them at will. Müller’s plays preserve and develop 
this mechanical quality, but in a quite different direction: 
rather than a useful tool, they are more like a powerful but 
sealed engine, one that excludes the intrusion of any human 
agency. The compulsive, driving rhythms of The Horatian and 
Mauser are machinery in which their performers might get trapped 
rather than contraptions they might adapt for their own use. The 
texts themselves are awkward, angular, and cumbersome; they do 
not readily lend themselves to being performed, but if anything 
operate in opposition to their own staging. Conflict is thus 
partly shifted from within the text to between text and the 
physical stage itself; as Müller puts it, the ‘translation of 
text into theatre’ should be ‘a test of endurance for the 
participants… the body’s struggle against the violence of the 
expediency of ideas’. While Brecht’s plays tend to integrate 
text and actual performance, making the one open and adaptable 
to the other, Müller’s insist on their incompatibility. Although 
his note to Mauser concludes with detailed suggestions for how 
the play might be performed, a more  accurate description of how 
he ‘envisaged’ its performance can be found in a late interview:  
Mauser was the first time that I didn’t have the slightest idea 
how it was going to be done on stage. Not the remotest idea. 
There was a text, and in my imagination there was no space, no 
stage, no actors for this text, nothing. […] I mean, basically 
these are plays or texts only for staging inside my brain or my 
head. They’re performed inside this skull. 
Here the collective unity of the Lehrstück group of committed 
activist-players is supplanted by the isolated unity of the 
author’s individual mind, in what appears as an extreme 
inversion of Brecht’s original intentions. The Lehrstück, in 
Müller’s handling of it, becomes a kind of negative of itself; 
something enclosed, uncanny and sinister. 
These various mutations – the turn towards allegory, the revival 
of archaic themes and forms, the growing hermeticism of the 
texts – might thus be thought of as the outcome of a rigorous 
test of endurance to which Müller subjected the form; a test 
that aimed at determining whether a genuinely political theatre 
could survive in the circumstances in which he wrote. It perhaps  
is for this reason that they come across as works that exist 
under such a high degree of formal tension, a tension that seems 
constantly to threaten to implode and turn them into the 
opposite of what they were supposed to mean. But at the same 
time, the tension is a necessary precondition to the clear, 
consistent and logically developed series of political lessons 
they aim to convey. For in essence these plays are a set of 
reflections upon the legacy of Stalinism, and a series of 
proposals for a politics aimed at addressing it, a politics that 
calls for pragmatism mixed with idealism, an open debate about 
the crimes of the past, and maintains the need for a harsh 
revolutionary ethics while clearly distinguishing this from the 
ideology that justified the atrocities of Stalinism. It is a 
politics that, above all, requires a reconception of what it 
means to be human, one that reveals Müller as a Marxist anti-
humanist in the mould of Louis Althusser or Theodor Adorno. In 
what follows, we shall briefly consider each of these plays in 
turn. 
Philoctetes, the first play in the series, was written over a 
period of six years, from 1958 to 1964, thus partially predating 
the period of Müller’s ‘internal exile’. It is based on a 
tragedy by Sophocles, and deals with an incident from the Trojan 
war. On the journey to Troy, Philoctetes saves the Greek fleet 
from a vengeful seagod by sustaining a serpent’s bite. But the 
poison from the wound leaves him consumed by ravaging pain, and 
his cries prevent the Greeks from completing their sacrifice. To 
save their mission, Odysseus, the expedition’s leader, decides 
to have him marooned on a barren island. Ten years later, with 
the Trojan war still raging, Odysseus hears a prophecy that the 
Greeks will not be victorious without Philoctetes’ aid. He 
therefore he returns to the island, accompanied by Achilles’ son 
Neoptolemos, to persuade Philoctetes to follow him back to Troy. 
This is the starting point for Müller’s play, whose dramatic 
interest essentially resides in the question of whether its 
three protagonists will be able to overcome their mutual 
distrust and loathing to cooperate in their common interest. 
Neoptolemos, the young idealist, wavers between his commitment 
to the mission and his ethical qualms about the methods used, a 
situation complicated by his personal hatred for Odysseus. 
Philoctetes, embittered and driven half-mad by his years of 
isolation, sways between his desire to escape the life-in-death 
of exile, and an understandable reluctance to rejoin the society 
that put him there. In this situation, Odysseus, the cynical 
pragmatist, attempts to coordinate these two antagonistic 
positions to achieve the outcome needed for victory over Troy. 
The possibility of this emerges and then retreats several times 
throughout the play, brought on by Odysseus’ skilful 
machinations and then frustrated by Neoptolemos’ naïve sense of 
personal honour. Eventually, the miscarrying of the plan ends in 
catastrophe: political expediency forces Neoptolemos to kill 
Philoctetes, whom he pities, in order to save Odysseus, whom he 
loathes. 
At first sight it might seem that the lesson of the Lehrstück is 
the necessity for Odysseus’ political cynicism over the 
‘individualistic’ positions represented by the other two. But as 
Müller clearly stated in an interview, the play presents ‘three 
false attitudes to reality, to history’: Odysseus’ position is 
thus just as false as the others’. And indeed, on closer 
inspection it becomes clear that he too contributes to the 
outcome precisely through his attempts to control the situation. 
For Odysseus’ pragmatism is of a kind that has lost sight of its 
own purpose, and become pure manipulation. The result is that he 
cannot offer Philoctetes any reason to return with him beyond 
mere physical survival, and the prospect of being used again in 
another tactical game. And for Philoctetes, who has already 
suffered so much from being treated this way, it is ultimately 
not reason enough to go on living.    
Philoctetes has been commonly interpreted as an allegory of the 
rehabilitation of Party members who were imprisoned or 
persecuted under Stalin. In the wake of Khrushchev’s secret 
speech, there was growing recognition in eastern bloc countries 
of the crimes committed under Stalin. But it was recognition of 
a limited kind: while the injustices were recognised, the deeper 
reasons behind them, such as the crushing of Party democracy and 
the exclusion of Soviet citizens from all political decision-
making, never were. In the figures of Odysseus and Philoctetes, 
Müller presents the allegory of a Stalinist Party official 
trying to bring one of his victims back into a polity that 
remains committed to the politics of cynical pragmatism that led 
to his persecution to begin with. Thus the ‘correct’ attitude to 
history that his audience is to derive from the three ‘false’ 
ones is that, without a revival of genuine radical politics, the 
victims of the regime will refuse reintegration back into it. 
The next play, The Horatian, is both a development and expansion 
on this theme. Its subject is also taken from the classical 
past, this time Livy’s history of early Rome. The two warring 
city states, Rome and Alba, find themselves faced by the common 
threat of an overwhelming Etruscan army. To preserve their 
strength against this common enemy, they decide to resolve their 
differences by a single combat between two representatives 
chosen by lot from each side. Rome chooses a Horatian, Alba a 
Curiatian; they fight, and the Curiatian is wounded. The 
Curiatian begs for mercy, reminding the Horatian that he is 
betrothed to his sister; but the Horatian replies, ‘my bride is 
Rome’, and kills his opponent. He returns home victorious, only 
to find his grieving sister refuses to embrace him. Enraged, he 
kills her as well, at which point the cheers of the Roman people 
fall silent. The rest of the play is concerned the their 
deliberations over what to do with this ‘victor-murderer’, who 
has killed ‘once for Rome and once not for Rome’.  
The Romans are divided over he should be ‘honoured as a victor 
or punished as a murderer’. Several solutions are proposed, 
including the one that both his victory and crime should be 
simply forgotten, but these are rejected. Eventually it is 
determined that the Horatian be judged as both victor and 
murderer, and honoured and punished as such. Accordingly, he is 
first crowned with laurels while the entire Roman people kneel 
before him. Then the laurel crown is torn from his brows and he 
is beheaded. The same procedure is used in the treatment of his 
corpse: his reassembled body is borne aloft on his comrades’ 
shoulders, and then thrown to the dogs. Discussion then turns to 
how the Horatian is to be remembered by posterity, and the 
conclusion mirrors the judgement passed upon him. He is to be 
remembered as both a victor and a murderer, and those who 
acknowledge the one fact and not of the other are to be 
punished. This, it becomes clear, is not only a measure aimed at 
preserving truth and justice but language itself, and the 
capacity it offers for making sense of the world: 
For our words must remain pure. For 
A sword can be broken and a man 
Can also be broken, but words 
Fall irrevocably into the workings of the world 
Leaving things knowable or unknowable. 
In contrast to Philoctetes, The Horatian shifts the role of 
judge of the events from the audience to the performers 
themselves (an innovation that partly lies behind its 
combination of all speaking parts into a single verse block, 
whose lines are to be distributed at the players’ own 
discretion). In an interview, Müller made clear that this change 
was inspired by contemporary events: 
My earlier plan provided for an open end: the audience as judge. 
At the end of 1968 the freedom of choice no longer seemed to me 
to be a given… the terribly simple (naïve) solution seemed 
realistic. 
The date of the play is crucial to its allegory. For 1968 was 
the year of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the 
crushing of its brief period of reform Communist government 
known as the ‘Prague Spring’. Rome and Alba thus now appear in 
the guise of the two Communist states, their common enemy the 
Etruscans as the western powers facing them. It is notable that 
Müller’s treatment of the allegory does not – as one might 
expect – clearly come down on the side of the reformists against 
the conservatives. Rather it proposes a way for both sides to 
successfully resolve their differences by coming to terms with a 
common past. The figure of the Horatian is thus revealed as that 
of Stalin himself – or perhaps more accurately, of the 
‘Stalinised’ Communist parties that were his legacy. Coming to 
terms with that legacy means grasping in it in its full 
contradictory nature, as one of both victory – notably over 
Germany in the Second World War – and murder, of the killings of 
many thousands of innocent people. At the same time, it also 
requires the recognition that this resolution will never be 
complete: there will always be a ‘remainder… that cannot be 
unmade’, an irreducible residue of trauma and pain that cannot 
be made amends for or overcome.  
      
Just as The Horatian takes a theme from Philoctetes and develops 
and expands it, so Mauser does the same with The Horatian, in a 
process of clarification and refinement that approaches most 
directly basic problematic behind all three plays, that of 
revolutionary violence itself. Perhaps this is one reason why 
Mauser feels like a consummation of the series, a sense 
confirmed by its apparent abandonment of classical allegory for 
a twentieth century subject-matter taken from the Russian Civil 
War. But despite this change, Mauser remains an allegory like 
the other two, albeit in a more complex and ambiguous sense than 
the first two.   
Its subject, as Müller informs us in his note, is taken from the 
Soviet writer Mikhail Sholokhov’s novel Quiet Flows the Don, and 
deals with a Party activist caught up in the violent events of 
the ‘Red Terror’ that followed the Bolshevik seizure of power in 
1917. But its more important literary model are Brecht’s 
Lehrstücke themselves - its text reads like a bricolage of 
quotations and allusions from several of these – and most 
specifically his famous, not to say notorious, Lehrstück from 
1930, The Measures Taken.  
The play takes the form of a dialogue between three Communist 
Activists and a Control Chorus, representing the central Party 
authorities. The Activists have just returned from a mission to 
China, where their task has been to spread propaganda among the 
workers. The mission has been successful, but they report that 
during the course of it they were forced to kill one of their 
own supporters. The Activists ask the Chorus to give its 
judgement on this decision, and the Chorus consents. They then 
relate their story by performing it on stage in front of this 
audience. In China, they explain, they meet a young sympathiser 
– the Young Comrade – who offers to help them in their work. The 
activists give him a series of tasks to perform - spreading 
propaganda, arming the workers, organising for an uprising – at 
which he successively fails. In each case, his failure is caused 
by an ‘excess of humanity’: the Young Comrade puts his feelings 
of empathy - sympathy for the workers and loathing for their 
oppressors, indignance at their suffering and impatience to end 
it - before rational reflection and tactical consideration. On 
each occasion, his comrades discuss with him where he went 
wrong, and encourage him to do better the next time. His final 
error, however, is catastrophic: he organises a premature 
uprising of workers which is brutally suppressed by the 
authorities. Forced to flee, the activists decide that their 
only way to evade capture and save the mission is to kill the 
Young Comrade and destroy his body. They propose this to him 
and, having considered the alternatives, he consents. He is shot 
and thrown into a chalk pit and the mission is saved. The Party 
committee, having heard their account, approves their action.  
Mauser also takes the form of a dialogue between an individual 
activist, known only as A, and a Chorus, but in this case the 
task facing them is quite different. They are not preparing the 
way for a revolutionary uprising, but defending a revolutionary 
government that has come to power. Their task is no longer the 
vanguard one of agitational and propaganda work among the 
masses, but the ‘struggle in the rear’: the suppression and 
extermination of the new government’s political enemies.  
It is a struggle that has simultaneously grown more violent and 
more abstract than the one in Brecht’s play. Mauser sets aside 
all the tactical questions explored in The Measures Taken to 
concentrate on the single issue of political murder. In contrast 
to the variety and complexity of the tasks the Young Comrade is 
required to perform, A’s have shrunk to the grotesquely 
repetitive one of endlessly killing prisoners; the process of 
learning and teaching is here reduced to the monstrous ‘lesson… 
of the bullet’. This alienating and dehumanising work offers few 
opportunities for lessons, or for considering alternative forms 
of action, which for A have narrowed to the single choice of 
killing or not killing, in circumstances where, as the Chorus 
reminds him, his task ‘must be / Performed by someone else if 
not by you’. At the same time, refusing the task barely seems an 
option for A at all: the stakes are already too high, the moral 
pressure too overwhelming, to really act any differently. 
Meanwhile, this narrowing of the scope for action has been 
accompanied by a vast expansion in the scope for error. In The 
Measures Taken, the Young Comrade commits three mistakes before 
his final, fatal one; A, by contrast, is killed for just one – 
if mistake it can be called at all.  This change in the nature 
of the revolutionary tasks demanded by the situation also has 
the effect that the error committed by A is different. While the 
Young Comrade’s mistake arises from an excess of humanity, a 
placing of empathy before rational calculation, A’s might be 
called an excess of inhumanity, an instance of uncontrollable 
and violent psychic breakdown, which he is able to anticipate 
but not avoid.  
It is notable that the debate between A and the Chorus is 
simultaneously one over the concrete immediate issues of the 
necessity of killing and dying, and the apparently far more 
abstract one of the definition of a human being, and that it 
effectively interweaves the two. The paradox of the Revolution 
is that it is made in the name of a humanity that does not yet 
exist, a humanity that the very making of the Revolution is 
supposed to bring into being. A’s first appeal against his 
sentence of death is ultimately that of his own fallibility, 
which he explains in terms of his own humanity: ‘I’ve made a 
mistake… I’m human’. But when asked to define what being human 
means, he can only come up with his own capacity to die, and his 
desire not to (‘I don’t want to die’). The Chorus does not 
consider this definition false, so much as irrelevant. It does 
not offer a counter-definition, but rather an injunction: that A 
must learn. What needs to be learnt is that no definition can be 
given until the preconditions for producing the ‘human’ are met. 
And they will not be met unless the political tasks necessary to 
bring them about are met. 
A appears to be able to accept this argument in theory, but in 
practice it is not enough to sustain him. The sacrifices 
demanded of him – of his conscience, and then of his life itself 
– seem impossible to make in the absence of a guarantee that 
they will not be made in vain. But it is precisely this that he 
must act in the absence of. The Chorus’ reply to this vital 
question, the one that might sustain him in his work, is 
unequivocal, and hardly reassuring: ‘We know what you know, you 
know what we know.’ Guarantees are not to be found through 
definitions or access to special knowledge, but rather through 
collective praxis: the truth of the situation will be created by 
their acting upon it.  
A is in a sense caught between the existence of what might be 
called the human as it actually exists, as a suffering, finite 
being – and the human as it might be. This position – the 
position of the revolutionary – is one of radical exclusion from 
both, and it ultimately proves unbearable. Like the Young 
Comrade in the Measures Taken, it is precisely the suspension of 
empathy that A cannot sustain; but unlike him, A is able only to 
ignore his feelings of ‘humanity’ at the cost of transforming 
them into their opposite: into an excess of ‘inhumanity’; 
empathy turns into wild aggression.  
The mistake that condemns him is not, as with the Young Comrade 
or his predecessor B, a substantive disobeyal of orders: in the 
play, A only ever kills those he has been ordered to kill. The 
difference consists rather in the manner in which he kills them, 
for it is this that which reveals that he is unable any longer 
to draw the distinction between ‘human beings’ – which do no yet 
exist - and ‘enemies’, which are only too real. It is a matter 
not of the individuals themselves but the subjects addressed by 
his killing: A’s crime is to kill prisoners as if they were 
people (that is to say, with an irrational excess of violence), 
rather than as if they were enemies (that is to say, with 
proportionate, rational violence). The distinction seems 
abstract, but for the Party it is crucial. An inability to 
distinguish between human being and enemy makes A himself an 
enemy: it excludes him from the revolutionary collective, and 
from the future society that collective is trying to create. 
That, according to the Chorus, is why he has to die. 
Like Brecht’s play before it, Müller’s quickly became the 
subject of considerable controversy, finding itself condemned, 
although for very different reasons, in both east and west. The 
East German authorities took no time in labelling it counter-
revolutionary, and Mauser became the only one of Müller’s plays 
to be subject to a formal legal ban in his own country. By 
contrast, several West German critics condemned it as an 
apologia for revolutionary violence in general, and for Stalin’s 
crimes in particular. The account of its arguments outlined 
above, however, suggests a quite different conclusion: Mauser is 
neither a condemnation nor a glorification of revolutionary 
violence, but rather an exploration of its nature and 
implications. 
To see this, it is important to grasp that the argument of the 
Chorus is emphatically not a Stalinist one. For its insistent 
position of historical ignorance is one that Stalinist ideology 
would never have tolerated. The Stalinist justification for acts 
of political violence was always made from a position of 
privileged knowledge, one that provided the objective meaning of 
their own and others’ actions. In the Stalinist view, the Party 
can see the present with historical hindsight, as if it occupied 
some notional future point from which it could look back on the 
present, revealing it in its ‘objective’ significance, and 
guaranteeing the correctness of all the decisions it might take, 
including political murder. 
As we have seen, this is not at all the argument of the Chorus 
in Mauser. Instead of offering certainties, it insists it has no 
privileged view of things; instead of defining the humanity in 
whose name the Revolution is being made, it insists that it 
cannot be known. This is a far harsher position to the Stalinist 
one, in that it requires that one accept the moral consequences 
of one’s actions in circumstances where one cannot know what 
those consequences will be. Indeed, if anyone’s position could 
be called Stalinist in Mauser, it is that of A himself, who 
demands to know ‘here and now’ what a human being is and when 
the Revolution will eventually triumph, and who finally asks for 
assurance that his death, and the deaths of those he has killed, 
will not have been in vain. 
Thus Mauser rejects both the liberal and Stalinist positions 
regarding revolutionary violence. The methods of the revolution 
are not to be justified in terms of its inevitable triumph or 
the ‘objective guilt’ of its enemies. We might recall at this 
point the manner in which the Lehrstück is supposed to be 
performed: the argument it sets out is not designed to be 
passively accepted by an audience, but analysed and debated by 
those performing it. This does not preclude them rejecting the 
Chorus’ arguments, or claiming answers to the questions that it 
considers unanswerable. But it is at this point too, the present 
in which it is performed, that the question of its allegory 
poses itself most relevantly. Mauser clearly alludes to the 
Stalinist purges of the 1930s, that paroxysm of blood-letting 
that finished off for good the revolutionary hopes of October, 
but it is not itself an allegory of those events. Rather it 
might be seen as a utopian or perhaps counter-factual allegory – 
an allegory of events that never happened, but might have. For 
in it, it is the revolutionary collective that triumphs, and the 
Stalinist reactionaries that are led to the wall. 
 
